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PROPOSED REVISIONS CONCERNING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CAVEAT VENDOR
James J. White
Both industrial sellers and consumer sellers
should look at proposals for revision of the sections
relating to warranty liability in Article 2 .
Particularly important are the sections on warranty,
express and implied, on third-party liability,
disclaimers and limitation of remedy, notice, and
statute of limitations. Using current law as a
baseline, revised Article 2 increases sellers'
liability in at least half a dozen ways and decreases
it in no significant way.
1. Express Warranty, 2-313. Revised 2-313
expands sellers' liability in at least three important
ways.
a.

For all practical purposes the reliance
requirement is gone from 2-313.
Reliance on a warranty was a
requirement for recovery under the
Sales Act; in current Article 2 express
warranties must be part of the "basis
of the bargain." This requirement has
now shrunk to a provision that denies
warranty liability only where the
seller "establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the buyer was
unreasonable in concluding that an
affirmation or promise, description or
sample became part of the agreement."

b.

Revised Section 2-313(c)
"presumptively" creates a warranty to
persons who were not parties to the
contract with certain limitations
specified i-313 (d).

c.

Revised Section 2-313(a) contains the
statement from current 2-313 that words
like "warrant" and "guarantee" need not
be included to make a warranty, but
omits the reference in current 2-313 to
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puffing ("but an affirmation merely of
the value of the goods or a statement
merely to be the seller's opinion or
accommodation of the goods does not
create a warranty.")
d.

consider how the new modifications
might work.
(1),

Assume that United Airlines buys
Pratt & Whitney jet engines for
its new 737s. The engines do not
produce the thrust as promised,
require more maintenance than
expected and require expensive
protection against icing. Assume
that Pratt and Whitney had an
effective disclaimer in its
agreement with United Airlines and
had warned that in certain
applications the engine would not
perform exactly as both it and
United had hoped it would.
May united search the united
States, or perhaps the world
market, for advertisements,
brochures, and technical manuals
that have been passed out to
potential buyers by Pratt &
Whitney describing this engine? If
they find one that specifies how
it deals with ice, projected time
until overhaul, projected
maintenance costs, may they rely
on it, notwithstanding the fact
they did not have such express
warranties in their contract? Note
that there is no requirement in 2313(c) that the warranty be part
of the contract between the buyer
and seller. Nor is there any
requirement there that the buyer
know of the warranty only that it
be made to the "public."
Presumably all advertisements-even if not widely distributed-are to the "public" and so
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available for ex post facto
reliance.
Section 2-313(d) denies the
warranty if it is made to "a
segment of the public of which the
buyer was not a part". Since
"consumer" is used elsewhere but
not here, it is clear that
"public" does not refer just to
'consumers. Presumably united
Airlines is a segment of the
public. Moreover its "segment"
would include all airlines flying
737's.
(2)

Assume that China Air Lines sues
Pratt & Whitney for promises made
in private negotiations to United
Airlines and for promises made in
certain technical manuals and
brochures distributed to several
potential buyers in the United
States. Assume for the purpose of
the argument that China Air Lines
did not know of those promises
until it took discovery after it
had commenced its law suit.
can Pratt & Whitney win on the
argument that under 2-313(b) that
"the buyer was unreasonable in
concluding that an affirmation,
promise, description, or sample
became part of the agreement." · If
one assumes that the buyer had to
know of the warranty at the time
the agreement was made (i.e., one
in ignorance of a promise is
incapable of concluding that the
promise became part of the
·
agreement), there is some hope for
sellers. That is not what the
section means; the buyer will
argue that its reasonableness must
be measured after it found out
about the affirmation. Ignorance
of the affirmation is no defense.
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Buyer could have diffi~ulty
proving that private promises to
other airlines should become part
of its agreement . on the other
hand, the same engine should
perform the same way in a 737
whether it is in China Air Lines'
737 or the 73 7 of united.
It is hard to see how a seller
will successfully defend a case
under 2-313(b) since it must show
by "clear and convincing evidence"
that the buyer was unreasonable.
If buyer's ignorance of the
warrants at the time of the deal
does not render reliance
unreasonable, what does?
(3)

Assume a buyer who sees the
television advertisement that
shows how a Lincoln Continental
squats down one or two inches when
it goes fast and emphasizes the
power and performance of its
engine. Buyer is involved in an
accident and sues the seller for
breach of warranty based upon that
television ad. Assume further that
the automobile is successful
beyond the Ford's dream and
attracts a large number of aging
Corvette drivers who drive just as
fast as when they were young, but
not as well. Those buyers have a
wide range of accidents with the
new Continental. Plaintiff brings
a class action suit dependent upon
the advertisement and irrespective
of the fact that most of the
purchasers of the automobile never
saw the television advertisement.
If the advertisement is an
affirmation or a promise of how
the automobile will handle at high
speed and is broken , can there now
be a recovery on behalf of the
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class irrespective of the fact
that only a few of them ever saw
the advertisement? Surely Ford
will have a hard time showing wby
clear and convincing evidencew
that the buyers were unreasonable
in concluding that the affirmation
was part of the bargain if it is
not protected by a buyer's

ignorance of the advertisement. As
to some of the damages, Ford might
be saved by revised 2-318(d)(3)(no
consequential damages against a
remote seller).
c.

2.

Revised 2-313 invites every
disappointed industrial buyer to make
claims on the basis of technical
writings, brochures, television
advertisements, and written
advertisements. Presumably consumers
can be foreclosed by making the
advertisements yet less informative
than they are today. (See the cigarette
ads.) But I doubt that we should give
industrial sellers a major disincentive
against disclosure of technical
material. If the technical material is
important for the buyer to understand
the product and to determine whether it
is suitable for buyer's use, it is
desirable to encourage the seller to
give as much detail to the buyer as
possible. If, no matter what the
contract says, such disclosure may
become a warranty--as seems to be the
case under 2-313--revised 2-313 will
give the seller an incentive not to
1isclose relevant data in its
industrial advertising and technical
materials.

Section 2-314. Implied warranty of
Merchantability
The only significant addition in revised 2314 is subsection 2-314(b)(7) which says
that a seller impliedly warrants "in the

590

case of goods purchased for human
consumption or for application to the human
body, [the goods are] reasonably fit for
consumption or application." The comment
notes that this section rejects the
"foreign/natural ingredient" dichotomy and
leaves the courts to determine when goods
containing natural ingredients (e.g., bones,
cherry pits • • • ) are not reasonably fit
for consumption. If that were all revised 2314(b)(7) did, sellers should have no
complaint.
Revised 2-314(b)(7) can be read as aimed at
the pariah products (cigarettes, alcohol,
snuff, guns, and even butter). Recall the
old comment, undoubtedly written by Prosser
that appears in current 402(A) which says:
"Good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because it will make
some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics; but bad
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount
of fusel oil, is unreasonably
dangerous. Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because
the effects of smoking may be harmful;
but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous. Good butter is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because,
if such be the case, it deposits
cholesterol in the arteries and leads
to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil,
is unreasonably dangerous." Restatement
of Torts 2d S 402A, Comment i.
Arguably no exception like that in the
402(A) comment was ever built into 2-314. It
always required goods to be fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used
and one could always have argued that if
cigarettes cause cancer, they are not fit
for those ordinary purposes. On the other
hand, under the current 2-314, one could
argue that "ordinary purposes" have the

591

meaning described by Prosser's comment in
402(A), namely that the warranty was freedom
from foreign substances, not a warranty that
the substances known to be present in
cigarettes or alcohol would not be
injurious. Under that interpretation,
cigarettes that caused cancer or heart
disease, alcohol that caused drunkenness and
cirrhosis, bullets that killed and butter
that fattened would not be lacking in
merchantability because of those facts.
The addition of (b)(7) makes that argument
harder for a defendant seller. To maintain
that cigarettes are "fit for ordinary
purposes" because their ordinary purposes
are to make people psychologically content,
to satisfy their cravings for nicotine and
oral stimulation is harder under the
proposed language, for revised 2-314 makes
the specific warranty that such goods are
reasonably fit for "consumption". The new
warranty seems to be saying more than they
are fit for ordinary purposes; it is saying
they are fit for a particular purpose,
namely, consumption, i.e., a warranty that
"this commodity does not cause disease."
Do we wish to impose such an implied
warranty on the manufacture of consumer
products that are known or widely believed
to have injurious consequences when a large
part of the adult population of the world-knowing of those injurious consequences-nevertheless chooses to confront them? I ·
doubt it. If that is what 2-314(b)(7) means,
I assume that the manufacturers of snuff,
cigarettes, alcohol--possibly even butter,
coffee, and the like--will argue for change
in ( b} ( 7).
3.

Section 2-316
Section 2-316 is similar to the old 2-316
but it has two or three changes that are
deleterious to the seller's interests.
a.

Compare old (3)(b) with new (d)(2).
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Section 2-316(3 ) (b). Not\ttrithstandl.ng
subsection (2) • • • (b) when the buyer
before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to def ect s which an
examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him[.]
Revised Section 2-316(d) (2). Except in a
consumer contract, the following rules
apply: • • . (2) If the buyer before
entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as
desired or has refused to examine the goods,
there is no implied warranty with regard to
nonconformities that an examination in the
circumstances would have revealed.
The former section burdens the buyer with
defects the buyer "ought" to have seen, but
the new section burdens him only with
defects which inspection "would have
revealed." Assume a buyer who inspects,
fails to see a defect (and whose examination, therefore, did not and therefore would
not have revealed them) and sues. Assume,
for example, that a prospective buyer of a
used 737 from United Airlines, examines the
airplane but fails to take off the panels on
the bottom and so does not examine the ribs
and the keel. If he had done so, assume he
would have discovered that the ribs and keel
were heavily corroded. Six months after the
purchase buyer sues seller for breach of
warranty. Under the current 2-316, if it
could be proven that a normal inspection
"ought" to and would have uncovered the
defects, the buyer would be stuck. under the
new wording, having done an inspection,
buyer can argue · that his inspection was
adequate and that the absence of the "ought"
language means that (d)(2) does not reach
this case. In effect the buyer would argue
that when an inspection has been done, no
hypothetical inspection is assumed.
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b.

For practical purposes revised 2-316(e)
outlaws disclaimers against consumers. It
states: "the terms are inoperative unless
the seller proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the seller understood and
expressly agreed to the term." Will the
consumer's initials beside the disclaimer be
effective? I doubt it. Seller must show not
only that the consumer buyer saw the
disclaimer, read it, but also that he
understood it and "agreed" to it. What
evidence clearly and convincingly proves
"understanding"? Short of the buyer's
admission, I know of none. I wonder if
subsection (e) is drafted the way it is
because the Drafting Committee was not
willing to say the truth: "disclaimers are
ineffective against consumers."
But why should disclaimers be ineffective
against consumers? Most consumers can read;
even people who have never been to law
school can understand language like "As Is,"
"We make no warranties about these used
cars". It has always seemed to me that
consumer advocates are disdainful of the
intelligence of their clients. Note that
revised section 2-316 has little to do with
consumers who are injured because those
consumers have tort claims that will not be
touched by warranty disclaimers.

4.

Section 2-318. Rights of third parties who
have no contract with the seller
a.

The rule stated in revised 2-318(b) is
a good one. Sellers stumbling upon 2318(b) might think that they have found
something in revised Article 2 that is
favorable to a seller because it
appears to equate the rights of a
remote buyer to the rights of the
initial buyer. But what subsection (b)
gives, subsection (c) takes away. It
reads in full as follows:
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Revised S 2-318(c).
(c) A buyer's rights and remedies for
breach of a warranty are determined under
this article, as modified by subsection (d),
without regard to privity of contract or the
terms of the contract between the seller and
the immediate buyer if:
(1) the buyer is a consumer to
whom a warranty was extended under
subsection (a) and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act applies or the seller is a
merchant under Section 2-314(a) who sold
unmerchantable goods; or
(2) the buyer is a member of the
public to whom an express warranty was made
by the seller under Section 2-313(c) or (d).
b.

I am uncertain about the meaning of
revised 2-318(c)(l). Probably it
applies only to buyers (i) who are
consumers and (ii) who are covered by
Magnuson Moss or who have a claim
against a merchant under 2-314(a). The
other way to read it is to say that it
applies to all buyers and that it
covers (i) consumers under the Magnuson
Moss Act and (ii) all buyers where
there is warranty of merchantability
under 2-314(a). I think the latter
interpretation is incorrect.

c.

Note that (c)(2) takes away much of the
protection given by (b). Since
warranty to the public is not defined
in 2-313(c) or (d) and since it is
possible that a warranty could be to a
member of the public even though it was
made in a private context. The
subsection gives doubtful protection.
In any event, subsection (c) clearly
turns loose remote parties when the
buyer's claim is based on advertising,
brochures or the like.
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5.

d.

The most serious threat to sellers from
2-318, is the "discovery" rule for the
statute of limitat1ons in revised 2318(d)(3). Instead of the standard
statute of limitation which runs from
the time of the original sale {or from
the subsequent sale), this runs from
the time the remote buyer discovers or
should have discovered the breach.
Under this rule sellers can expect suit
from remote buyers who claim never to
have discovered the breach until a
product failed many years after the
sale. (Never mind that the machine had
been overhauled 17 times.)

e.

There is at least one nice thing in 2318 for sellers. That is (d)(3) which
prohibits remote buyers from recovering
consequential damages. Even that
present is limited by its reference to
(d)(2) and by the proviso that the
recovery can be had against an
intermediate seller for consequential
damages.

Notice, Revised Section 2-606(c)(l)
a.

Section 2-607(3) and Article 39 of the
CISG cut off a buyer's right to sue.
section 2-607(3) reads in part as
follows: "Where tender has been
accepted, the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be
barred from any remedy." Section 2606(c)(1) of the revision says: "the
buyer within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have
discovered a breach, shall notify the
seller of the breach. However, a
failure to give proper notice does not
bar the buyer from any remedy that does
not prejudice the seller."
Note two things about the new
terminology. First, it does not say
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directly what happens if the buyer
fails to give notice. Only by inference
does one conclude that certain remedies
might be cut off. second, to the
extent that the seller is unable to
prove prejudice, the failure to give
notice is not relevant to a later suit.
One can only guess how the courts will
use ,this term, but it is possible that
it will effectively delete a notice
requirement from the law.
b.

Assume that seller sells two generators
for $1 million each to buyer. Assume
some difficulty with the generators and
that seller does some repairs after
they are installed. A year after the
last work has been done the buyer
notifies the seller of breach, asks for
revocation of acceptance, and sues for
damages. What are the consequences of
2-606 (c)(l)? Who must prove what?
The seller is likely to say had he been
notified earlier he would have been
more diligent in his repairs, that he
might have replaced the generators, or
that he might have done other things to
determine whether the cause of the
deficiency was his or another person's.
These complaints of seller are likely
to be diffuse and non specific. Is the
burden on him to prove prejudice or the
burden on the buyer to prove the
absence of prejudice? Assume that he
does prove prejudice, what is the
remedy? Under the current notice
provision, the one failing to give
notice is barred from all remedy; it is
unequivocal. The same is true in the
CISG, but there is no such bar
specified in revised 2-606.

c.

To the extent one regards the notice
requirement in 2-607(3) as analogous to
a statute of repose (i.e., after a
certain period of time--when I have
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heard nothing bad from my buyer--who
may have been having some difficulties
with the product, I can rest at ease).
Presumably seller's lack of sleep is
not "prejudice" under 2-606(c}{1}.
Should we dilute the strong incentive
for quick action on the part of buyers?
Revised 2-606's dilution encourages
"warranty" suits that really arise not
from breach of warranty but from
buyer's remorse. I am always suspicious
of a buyer who does not complain at the
time he learns of the defect, but only
after he finds that he can buy the same
product or a better one at a lower
price or that he has no use for the one
purchased.
6. Agreed remedies, revised Section 2-719.
a.

Section 2-719(b} retains the familiar
denial of an exclusive remedy when it
"fails of its essential purpose."
Subsection (b}{2} says that "agreed
remedies outside the scope of and not
dependent on the failed agreed remedy
are enforceable as provided in this
section." From the comment it appears
that revised (b}(2) validates
agreements excluding consequential
damages and the like even if other
remedies fail. It indorses the American
Electric Power line of cases on the
question whether consequential damages
limitations survive ouster of repair
and replacement terms. Referring to
only agreed remedies as "being
enforceable" leaves the matter a little
unclear. Invariably these "agreed
remedies" are not "remedies" but
prohibitions of remedies (i.e., "no
consequential damages").

b.

Revised Section 2-719 makes
prohibitions of consequential damages
invalid against consumers. The
prohibition is easy to understand when
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one is talking of personal injury but
hard to understand otherwise.
Assume consumer buys an automobile; the
automobile fails to start several
mornings during a Minnesota February.
As a result of consumer's late arrival
at work on those mornings, she is fired
from her job and--according to her
later complaint--was despondent, is
divorced, and suffers hundreds of
thousands of dollars of lost wages,
pain and suffering, and loss of
consortium. Of course, one can argue
that there was no proximate
relationship between the unmerchantable
automobile and loss of her job, much
less her loss of marriage, but tell
that to a jury. Why should not she be
subject to the same sort of limitations
that business buyers are, at least with
respect to non-personal-injury losses?
Consumers have economic losses and
their losses for "pain and suffering••
where there is no personal injury are
hard to quantify and easy to
exaggerate. Why not allow their
prohibition?
7.

Revised Section 2-725
a.

In some ways the most threatening
proposal of all for sellers is found in
alternative two to revised 2-725(c)(2).
That section would adopt the "discovery
rule," for the statute of limitations
in warranty cases. Currently the
statute runs from the time of sale.

b.

Assume that buyer buys 747 from Boeing.
The aircraft works perfectly for six
years. At the beginning of the sixth
year, expensive additions have to be
made to hydraulic system and to the
mechanical parts of the rudder. Boeing
maintains that the express or implied
warranties given at the time of sale
have run out. The buyer argues that it
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could not have discovered the problem
and can therefore sue for breach of
warranty under 2-313 and 2-314. Because
the warranty commences to run only on
buyer's discovery of the defect. Why
should a seller be liable indefinitely
for an economic loss? Because of the
discovery rule in torts is that there
is no effective statute of limitations
in many tort cases. Sellers of
commodities that have the possibility
of injuring users remain perpetually
liable as long as the plaintiff can
claim that he did not discover the
defect until shortly before he was
injured.
The rise of the discovery rule in torts
is one of the most pernicious changes
in our law since 1900. I would argue
that that rule should not be
incorporated into our sales law. It
need not be added here to save
consumers because any consumer whose
blood has been spilt will be able to
recover on a tort theory outside of
Article 2.
CONCLUSION
By my calculation there is one small scrap in
this heap for sellers, namely, a restriction on
consequential damages found in 2-318. Everything
else--including things that seem to be favorable to
sellers such as the incorporation of the third-party
beneficiary theory in 2-318(a)--proves to be
inconsequential or contrary to the seller's interests.
Some of these are contrary to the seller's interests
in a small way; others could grow large. If the
Drafting Committee had followed the direction of the
Article 2 Study Committee, it would have proposed few
or none of the changes I have discussed above. Unless
there is considerable change in these provisions, I
fear that revised Article 2 will stumble at the
starting line.
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To see how a modern commercial sales law dealing
only with business parties might describe a seller's
liability, consider sections 35 through 40 of the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods
Section II. Conformity of the goods and third party
claims
Article 35
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of
the quantity , quality and description required by the
contract and which are contained or packaged in the
manner required by the contract.
(2) Except where the parties have agreed
otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract
unless they:
(a)

Are fit for the purposes for which goods of
the same description would ordinarily be
used;

(b)

Are fit for any particular purpose expressly
or impliedly made known to the seller at the
time of the conclusion of the contract,
except where the circumstances show that the
buyer did not rely, or that it was
unreasonable for him to rely, on the
seller's skill and judgment;

(c)

Possess the qualities of goods which the
seller has held out to the buyer as a sample
or model;

(d)

Are contained or packaged in the manner
usual for such goods or, where there is no
such manner, in a manner adequate to
preserve and protect the goods.

(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs
(a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack of
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conformity of the goods if at the time of the
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not
have been unaware of such lack of conformity.
Article 36

(1) The seller is liable in accordance with the
contract and this Convention for any lack of
conformity which exists at the time when the risk
passes to the buyer, even though the lack of
conformity becomes apparent only after that time.
(2) The seller is also liable for any lack of
conformity which occurs after the time indicated in
the preceding paragraph and which is due to a breach
of any of his obligations, including a breach of any
guarantee that for a period of time the goods will
remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for some
particular purpose or will retain specified qualities
of characteristics.
Article 37

If the seller has delivered goods before the date
for delivery, he may, up to that date, deliver any
missing part or make up any deficiency in the quantity
of the goods delivered, or deliver goods in
replacement of any nonconforming goods delivered or
remedy any lack of conformity in the goods delivered,
provided that the exercise of this right does not
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or
unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any
right to claim damages as provided for in this
Convention.
Article 38

(1) The buyer must examine the goods, or cause
them to be examined, within as short a period as is
practicable in the circumstances.
(2) If the contract involves carriage of the
goods, examination may be deferred until after the
goods have arrived at their destination.
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(3) If the goods are redirected in transit or
redispatched by the buyer without a reasonable
opportunity for examination by him and at the time of
the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or
ought to have known of the possibility of such
redirection or redispatch, examination may be deferred
until after the goods have arrived at the new
destination.
Article 39

(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack
of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice
to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of
conformity within a reasonable time after he has
discovered it or ought to have discovered it.
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to
rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does
not give the seller notice thereof at the latest
within a period of two years from the date on which
the goods were actually handed over to the buyer,
unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a
contractual period of guarantee.
Article 40

The seller is not entitled to rely on the
provisions of articles 38 and 39 if the lack of
conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could
not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to
the buyer.
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EXCERPTS FROM REVISED ARTICLE 2 SALES
JULY 29 - AUGUST 5, 1994 DRAFT

Revised Section 2-313. Express Warranties By
Affirmation, Promise, Description, or Sample.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b):

(1) An affirmation of fact or promise by the
seller, including a manufacturer, made directly or
through a dealer to the buyer which relates to the
goods presumptively becomes part of the agreement
between the seller and buyer and creates an express
warranty that the goods will conform to the
affirmation or promise. To create an express warranty
by affirmation or promise, it is not necessary that
the seller use formal words, such as "warrant" or
••guarantee", or have a specific intention to make a
warranty.
(2) A description of the goods presumptively
becomes part of the agreement between the seller and
buyer and creates an express warranty that the goods
will conform to the description.
(3)
the agreement
warranty that
the sample or

A sample or model that is made part of
presumptively creates an express
the whole of the goods will conform to
model.

(b) An express warranty is not created under
subsection (a) if the seller establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the buyer was unreasonable in
concluding that an affirmation, promise, description,
or sample became part of the agreement.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(d), a description, affirmation of fact, or promise
made by a seller, including a manufacturer, to the
public which relates to goods to be sold presumptively
creates an express warranty to any buyer that the
goods will conform to the description, affirmation, or
promise. Subject to Section 2-318, the buyer may
enforce the express warranty directly against the
seller, whether or not the express warranty is part of
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the contract with the buyer's immediate s eller..
(d) An express warranty is not created under
subsection (c) if the seller establishes th ~t the
description, affirmation of f act , or promise:
(1) was made more than a reasonable time
before or after the sale;
(2) was made to a segment of the public of
which the buyer was not a part; or
{3) resulted from a mistake upon which the
buyer did not reasonably rely.
Section 2-314(b)(7):

To be merchantable, goods, at a minimum, must:
{7) in the case of goods purchased for human
consumption or for application to the human body, be
reasonably fit for consumption or application.
Section 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of
warranties.

{a) words or conduct relevant to the creation of
an express warranty and words or conduct tending to
negate or limit a warranty must be construed whenever
reasonable as consistent with each other. Subject to
Section 2-202 with regard to parol or extrinsic
evidence, words negating or limiting a contract are
inoperative to the extent that construction is
unreasonable.
(b) Except in a consumer contract and as
otherwise provided in subsection (d), to exclude or
modify an implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it, the language must be in writing or
contained in a record, merition merchantability, and be
conspicuous.
{c) Except in a consumer contract and as
otherwise provided in subsection (d), to exclude or
modify an implied warranty of fitness, the language of
exclusion must be in a writing or contained in a
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record and be conspicuous. Language excluding all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states "There are no warranties that extend beyond the
description on the face hereof," or words of similar
import.
(d) Except in a consumer contract, the following
rules apply:
(1) All implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is", "with all faults", or other
language that in common understanding or under the
circumstances calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and clearly indicates that
there is no implied warranty.
(2) If the buyer before entering into the
contract has examined the goods or the sample or model
as fully as desired or has refused to examine the
goods, there is no implied warranty with regard to
nonconformities that an .examination in the
circumstances would have revealed.
(3) An implied warranty may be excluded or
modified by course of dealing, course of performance,
or usage of trade.
(e) In a consumer contract, terms disclaiming or
limiting the implied warranty of merchantability or
the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose
must be in a writing or record. The terms are
inoperative unless the seller proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the buyer understood and
expressly agreed to the term.
(f) Remedies for breach of warranty may be
limited in accordance with this article on liquidation
or limitation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy.
2-318. Ex~ension Of Express or Implied
warranties.

Sec~ion

(a) A seller's express or implied warranty, made
to an immediate buyer, extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to buy, use, or be affected by
the goods and who is damaged by breach of the
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warranty . In this section , "seller" includes a
manufacturer, "goods" includes a component
incorporated in substantially the same condit i on i nto
other goods, and "protected person" means a person to
whom a warranty extends under subsection (a).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsec tion
(c), the rights and remedies of a protected person
against a seller for breach of a warranty extended
under subsection (a) are determined by the enforceable
terms of the contract between the seller and the
immediate buyer and this article.
(c) A buyer's rights and remedies for breach of a
warranty are determined under this article, as
modified by subsection (d), without regard to privity
of contract or the terms of the contract between the
seller and the immediate buyer if:
(1) the buyer is a consumer to whom a
warranty was extended under subsection (a) and the
Magnuson-Moss warranty Act applies or the seller is a
merchant under Section 2-314(a) who sold
unmerchantable goods; or
(2) the buyer is a member of the public to
whom an express warranty was made by the seller under
Section 2-313(c) or (d).
(d) A buyer under subsection (c) has all of the
rights and remedies against a remote seller provided
by this article, except as follows:
(1) To reject or revoke acceptance, notice
must be given to the remote seller within a reasonaole
time after the buyer discovers or should have
discovered the breach of warranty.
(2) Upon receipt of a timely notice of
rejection or revocation of acceptance, the remote
seller has a reasonable time either to refund the
price paid by the buyer to the immediate seller or
cure the breach by supplying goods that conform to the
warranty. If the seller complies with this paragraph,
the remote buyer has no further remedy against the
seller, except for incidental damages under Section 2715(a). If the remote seller fails to c omply with this
subsection, the buyer may claim damages for breach of
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warranty, including consequential damages under
Section 2-715(b).
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a
buyer has no right to consequential damages unless
expressly agreed with the remote seller.
(4) A [claim for relief] for breach of a
warranty extended under subsection (a) or created
under Section 2-313(a)(3) accrues no earlier than the
time the remote buyer discovered or should have
discovered the breach.
(e) A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Section 2-606(c).
(c) If a tender has been accepted, the following
rules apply:
(1) The buyer, within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered a
breach, shall notify the seller of the breach.
However, a failure to give proper notice does not bar
the buyer from any remedy that does not prejudice the
seller.
(2) If the claim is one for infringement or
the like and as a result of the breach the buyer is
sued, the buyer must so notify the seller within a
reasonable time after receiving notice of the
litigation or be barred from any remedy over for
liability established by the litigation.
Section 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation
of Remedy, Including Damages.
(a) Subject to this section and Section 2-718:
(1) an agreement may provide for remedies in
addition to or in substitution for those provided in
this article or limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this article, including limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment
of the price or to repair and replacement of
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nonconforming goods or parts by the seller; and
(2) resort to a modified or limited remedy
is optional, but a remedy expressly agreed to be
exclusive is the sole remedy .
(b) If circumstances cause an exclusive agreed
remedy under subsection (a) to fail of its essential
purpose:
(1) to the extent that the agreed remedy has
failed, the aggrieved party has remedies as provided
in this article; and
(2) agreed remedies outside the scope of and
not dependent on the failed agreed remedy are
enforceable as provided in this section.
(c) Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded by agreement unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (d), a limitation or exclusion
of consequential damages for commercial loss is
presumed to be conscionable.
(d) In a consumer contract, the following rules
apply:
(1) If circumstances cause an exclusive,
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose and
the duration of any i mplied warranty has not expired,
a buyer may revoke acceptance and may obtain from the
seller either a refund of the price paid or a
replacem~nt of the goods and has other remedies as
provided in this article, to the extent permitted in
Section 2-701.
(2) Any term in the contract excluding or
limiting consequential damages is inoperative unless
the seller proves by clear and convincing evidence
that the buyer understood and expressly agreed to the
term.
(3) A limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages for injury to the person is
unconscionable as a matter of law.
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Revised Section 2-725(c) second alternative

(c) If a breach of warranty or indemnity occurs,
(a claim for relief] accrues when the buyer discovers
or should have discovered the breach.

